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Exporting the Developmental State: Japan’s Economic Diplomacy in the Arctic 
Japan remains a developmental state where the state guides and oversees economic 
development and the strong bureaucracy and businesses in turn complement each other in 
leading and shaping policies to achieve developmental goals. Japan retains the institutions 
deemed necessary to enhance the cooperative behaviour of the bureaucracy, businesses and 
politicians, and norms about what is important in order for an interventionist state to 
implement policies aimed at achieving economic development and the autonomy of the state. 
Externally Japan has practiced economic diplomacy with tools like development assistance to 
achieve its economic security and to promote the developmental state model abroad. The 
process of making foreign policy contextualised and reinforced the norms, both for Japan’s 
domestic and international audiences. Japan today tries to promote science and technology as 
a main catalyst for creating industries and supporting its domestic, export-oriented economy. 
This is based on Japan's own interpretation of its historical path and economic success and is 
also used to justify its engagement in the Arctic, a region where Japan does not have any 
sovereign territories. Japan’s Arctic policy is as an extension of its economic diplomacy and 
an attempt to export the Japanese developmental state model. 
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1.  Introduction 
The concept of ‘developmental state’ has made an essential contribution to analyses of the 
economic success of East Asia's economies since the early 1980s. It has emerged again recently in 
the context of the failures of the Washington Consensus, especially in emerging market economies. 
Following publication of Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, the developmental state became a shorthand for strong interventionist 
policies that the Japanese government implemented in order to achieve rapid industrialization and 
economic development before and after the end of WWII. 1 The term was then used to explain the 
booming economies of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia to extract institutional 
factors to make a developmental state a success. These analyses were important as states 
increasingly required to navigate economic globalization with astute political-economic strategies. 
The East Asian development model has been a template for innovative institution-building across 
Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia, referred to in order to counter the Washington Consensus 
orthodoxy.2 
Previous research investigated the theoretical evolution of the concept or the applicability of 
the concept to other regions of the world than East Asia.3 Nonetheless, it is rare to come across a 
debate about today’s Japan as a developmental state. Japan is mentioned in almost every paper as an 
epithet to the concept but the analysis rarely goes beyond that point. In addition, studies on 
developmental states and state-led development have mostly addressed the domestic context, but 
had relatively little to say about implications for foreign policy.4 Against this background, this paper 
tries to address the following questions: Is Japan still a developmental state? If so, how has it 
transformed itself over time? What are the implications of Japan's experience to the newer 
developmental states? What does the foreign policy of a modern developmental state look like? 
This paper shows that Japan remains a developmental state where the state guides and 
oversees economic development and the strong bureaucracy and businesses in turn complement 
each other in leading and shaping policies to achieve developmental goals. What has not changed 
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even after three decades since Johnson’s first assessment is the existence of strong, shared norms of 
communitarian capitalism, in which an interventionist state and the private sector collaborate and 
manage the market economy to achieve economic development and autonomy of the state. There 
were times the Japanese state pursued state-led development more rigorously, actively trying to 
govern the market and catch up with the Western industrialised economies, or less so, focusing 
more on the role of coordinating the state’s functions and businesses. Depending on the level of the 
state’s involvement in managing the process of development, the developmental state could be 
simultaneously both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. 
Externally, Japan, keenly conscious of its position in the global order and regional political 
economy, has practiced economic diplomacy with tools such as development assistance to achieve 
its economic security and to promote the developmental state model abroad. Japan today tries to 
promote science and technology as a main catalyst for creating industries and supporting its 
domestic, export-oriented economy. This concept is based on Japan's own interpretation of its 
historical path and economic success and is also used to justify its engagement in the Arctic, a 
region where Japan does not have any sovereign territories. Japan’s Arctic policy is as an extension 
of Japan’s economic diplomacy to achieve economic security, as well as an attempt to export the 
Japanese developmental state model to the Arctic Region using science and technology as a vehicle. 
This also functions as an attempt for Japan to self-justify its history of political and economic 
development and to create a feedback mechanism to adjust domestic institutions. 
This analysis will take place in four parts. First, by reviewing the existing literature, I will 
trace the intellectual history of Japan as a developmental state, with the long economic stagnation 
starting in the 1990s as a dividing line. Second, Japan’s foreign policy as a modern developmental 
state—particularly the segment that shows strong characteristics of the foreign policy of a 
developmental state—will be outlined. Third, I will refer to Japan’s engagement towards the Arctic 
Region as an empirical case and address characteristics of Japan’s developmental foreign policy 
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today. Finally, implications and recommendations based on Japan’s experience to the Global South 
will be discussed.  
2. Japan as a developmental state in full bloom 
In an attempt to explain Japan’s modern economic and political history, Chalmers Johnson 
introduced the concept of a ‘developmental state' to outline the role of the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) in facilitating collaboration and solving coordination problems between 
the state and big businesses, thereby, achieving Japan’s miraculous post-war economic growth.5 A 
developmental state is characterized as a state that sets overall targets, for instance redesigning 
industrial structures or setting standards to enhance the international competitiveness of its domestic 
firms. By comparison, a regulatory state such as the United States, which according to Johnson lies 
at the opposite end of a spectrum of the level of a state’s involvement in its national economy, a 
state may define the form and procedures to facilitate market competition but does not necessarily 
aspire to lead in order to control the results of competition in any particular direction. In a 
developmental state, the decision-making power lies in the hands of elite economic bureaucrats (in 
the case of Japan, MITI) while in a regulatory state, it lies in a democratically elected legislative 
assembly. 
The core of Johnson's argument is that the Japanese developmental state had a highly 
competent bureaucracy devoted to formulate and execute a planned process of economic 
development.6 In managing this developmental process, one of the key elements as well as a 
prerequisite is the existence of a 'pilot agency', such as MITI. Johnson pointed out that a 
developmental state is a system designed for latecomers in international economy, is most effective 
in handling conventional issues rather than a crisis situation and requires a broad societal consensus 
in favour of various economic targets. Johnson emphasised the role of MITI, in particular the 
manner it selected, prioritized, assisted and supervised particular industries to accelerate economic 
growth. The concept of a developmental state became widely accepted both in the West as it 
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managed to propose an alternative model to the communist-type command economies and the 
Western (Anglo-Saxon) mixed market economies. 
The 1980s, when Johnson’s idea was introduced to Japan, was a period when political 
economy as a scholarly discipline was only emerging in Japan. Japan was experiencing the first 
period of long-term stable economic growth since the Oil Shock in 1973 and Japanese society 
began to widely acknowledge that there were negative consequences of rapid economic 
development, such as acute environmental pollution. In this context, Japanese political scientists 
read Johnson’s book with an interest in understanding Japan’s political model rather than political 
economic model.7 It is rather interesting, therefore, that MITI and the Japanese Miracle was first 
found and translated from English to Japanese by MITI officials themselves. MITI then used the 
book to promote, defend and protect the ministry, its role as well as its industrial policy both inside 
and outside Japan.8 
Nonetheless, Johnson’s concept of a developmental state, especially his emphasis on the role 
of MITI as the sole pilot agency of Japan’s miraculous economic growth after its defeat in WWII, 
was considered rather constrictive. In reality MITI had not always had supremacy over political 
parties and big business; even inside the government, MITI was certainly one of the most powerful 
ministries but its activities had been restricted in its relations to the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ), as well as other numerous ministries on economic affairs.9 Scholars such as Daniel I. 
Okimoto asserted that what MITI managed to achieve was to set common targets with the private 
sector through various networks, such as keiretsu, a form of corporate structure in which a number 
of organizations link together, big business that plays a leadership role in a given industry, trade 
associations or other human networks.10 Japan was not a strong state, but rather, its consensus 
building process depended on the private sector’s active participation in the policy-making process. 
While industrial policies in other parts of the world were often considered as political interventions 
leading to inefficiencies, in Japan, thanks to MITI’s networking and coordination, industrial policies 
succeeded in advancing market functionalities. 
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Similarly, Kent E. Calder shed more light on the role the private sector played in Japan’s 
economic growth.11 Calder argued that it was private actors, such as the Japanese long-term credit 
banks that bore risks and provided capital to new businesses or business groups formed around sogo 
shosha (trading houses) as entrepreneurs, that took the initiative in the consensus-building process 
and coordination of industrial policies. Takeo Kikkawa revisited discussions on Japan’s post-war 
development policy and its relation to businesses and pointed out: a) that in Japan, the role of the 
government depends on whether an industry has the capacity to create an order or coordinate 
amongst themselves; b) that Japanese corporations are extremely willing to make investments if 
deemed necessary to survive competition; if industrial policy can match this behavior, it becomes 
successful.12 
Meanwhile, a parallel literature on ‘regulatory capitalism’ on Japan emerged, also helped by 
Japanese scholars’ keen interest to identify Japan’s political system or its model of capitalism rather 
than political economic model as Johnson’s work had done. Steven K Vogel focused on the process 
of regulatory reforms in Japan from the 1970s to the 1990s and concluded that because reforms 
were carried out by economic-related ministries, they did not inhibit the bureaucracy in realizing 
their inherent desire to maintain and extend authority. Examples could be found in the 
implementation of a regulation to manage the market competition process while simultaneously 
loosening regulations in some other sphere, or the maintenance of regulatory authority that those 
ministries deemed necessary. This promotion of regulatory reforms under a unified, consistent 
strategy allowed the Japanese state to execute reforms relatively smoothly, avoiding unnecessary 
politicisation or lawsuits.  
Overall, a common and general position of these analyses is that the main factor in the 
remarkable economic growth of Japan after WWII can be found in close collaboration between the 
Japanese state and the private sector. Japan as a developmental state is most characterized by the 
state’s role in shaping, directing and promoting the process of development, but the level of the 
state’s interference could vary. There were times the Japanese state pursued state-led development 
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more rigorously, actively trying to govern the market and catch up with the Western industrialised 
economies, or less so, focusing more on the role of coordinating the state’s functions and 
businesses. In other words, depending on the level of the state’s involvement in managing the 
process of development, the developmental state could be simultaneously both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. 
3.  Japan as a developmental state after the 1990s: Failure of the developmental state 
If the birth of the concept of Japan as a developmental state was based on its economic success after 
WWII, discussions on the Japanese political economic system after the 1990s turned to the analysis 
of reasons for its failure. The Japanese economy experienced the collapse of the so-called bubble 
economy in the beginning of the 1990s. Scholars contended that Japan’s institutional structure or 
industrial policies that had been considered as the major factor in the success could also have 
constituted the principal cause of the failure.13 Richard Katz argued that Japan had overlooked the 
appropriate timing to change its developmental policies. As a result, its economy turned into a 
deformed ‘dual economy’, a hybrid of extremely strong exporting industries and extremely weak 
domestic industries.14 When Japan achieved industrialization and graduated from the state of 
catching-up, Japan should have loosened its ‘developmentalist’ policies, which were to promote as 
many infant industries as possible. Instead Japan reinforced them and basically maintained the same 
industrial policies to protect and promote infant industries well into the 1970s and beyond, thereby 
exempting inefficient but politically connected industries from domestic and international 
competition. 
While a statist paradigm prevailed in social science theory during this period, for Japanese 
scholars, it was a time of introspection and soul searching.15 Having witnessed the bursting of the 
bubble-economy and the price the Japanese people had to pay for economic development, such as 
severe environmental problems, political scientists and economists alike asserted Japan’s “first-
class economic success” was premised on “third-class politics” and “economic superpower” was 
under the given conditions of the US-Japan alliance.16 They saw the Japanese system, which was 
still led by highly-skilled technocrats, as a bad example of a society that single-mindedly pursued 
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economic development but could not handle its negative consequences. Tadashi Yamaguchi argued 
that “from a view point of political studies, in order for a success of industrial policies to lead to 
people’s happiness, it is necessary for ‘politics’ (i.e. political parties, a government and a 
parliament) to coordinate incomes policy, social policy and ecological policy at a much higher level 
so that we can correspond to numerous positive and negative consequences of economic 
development”.17  
Meanwhile, the Japanese government was laboring at an attempt to increase Japan’s 
international influence by advancing the idea of developmental state outside of Japan. It is a well-
known fact among policymakers that the Japanese government provided generous financial 
assistance to the World Bank in order to write a report, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth 
and Public Policy, published in 1993.18 The report became a reference for the Japanese government 
to advocate its development aid strategy, emphasizing the role of a recipient government in resource 
mobilization and investment to export-oriented industries, versus European-style aid that focused on 
social infrastructure and humanitarian aid. 
After a long economic stagnation, the so-called ‘lost decade’ from 1991 to 2002, the 
Japanese economy managed to recover from 2002 to the end of 2007 albeit at a low level of 2 
percent annual GDP growth.19 This recovery highlighted the limits of theories whose point of 
departure were binary assumptions that the Japanese political economic model was bound to either 
succeed or fail.20 This was also influenced by the ‘institutional turn’ that studies of economics and 
sociology took in the early 2000s. 21 The institutional approach, particularly known via works 
related to a book edited by political economists Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, titled Varieties of 
Capitalism, which tried to categorise types of capitalist economies.22 
Marie Anchordoguy introduced a constructivist view on cooperative behaviour in the 
Japanese socio-economy and called the Japanese political economy a 'communitarian capitalism'.23 
Under communitarian capitalism an interventionist state and the private sector collaborate and 
manage the market economy in order to achieve economic development and autonomy of the state. 
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Building on Johnson’s theory, particularly the state’s role in Japan’s industrial development, 
Anchordoguy attempted to fill the gap that the original concept lacked: how such policies were 
developed and pursued. From this viewpoint, the existence of communitarian norms compelled 
successive Japanese leaders to pursue policies that represented a wider consensus about what was 
important, rather than "the self-interested policies of bureaucratic-authoritarian states such as those 
in Latin America, India, and Indonesia, which were bogged down with demands from wealthy 
landholders and burdened with the legacies of exploitative colonizers”.24 The goal of Japan as a 
developmental state was to raise the nation's level of prosperity but only so long as it did not reduce 
social stability, autonomy and security.25 If one follows the logic of communitarian capitalism, 
however, not only gains but losses are broadly distributed across society. For instance, during the 
economic downturn, the Japanese workers accepted lower wages in order to maintain the number of 
people employed. In this regard, the communitarian capitalism of Japan can be a system in which 
rooting out inefficiency is difficult.26 
What can be concluded from the discussion on Japan’s developmental state after the 1990s 
is that constant adjustments were required as it faced challenges over time and within the changing 
global system. Japan as a strong developmental state as in Johnson’s model was effective in 
handling conventional issues such as industrialisation and economic growth, but was ill-equipped to 
manoeuvre within a crisis situation such as the bursting of the bubble economy. Indeed, numerous 
Japanese scholars regard institutions that formed the basis of Japan as a developmental state as 
having burgeoned already in the 19th century, much earlier than the post WWII period Johnson 
captured.27  
4.  Japan's foreign policy as a developmental state 
As mentioned earlier a developmental state is a system designed for latecomers in international 
economy.28 Indeed, Japan had been a latecomer to the international system set in place by the early-
starters of the West.29 This status of Japan at the international level as well as the constraints and 
opportunities created by the norms and structures of the international system made Japan appear a 
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‘reactive state’.30 This relation between the state’s international status as a latecomer and reactivity 
in its international behaviour corresponds to a lack of studies on developmental states and their 
implications for foreign policy. However, as Japan eventually caught up with the other major 
industrialised powers through economic development, it became more proactive in its foreign 
policy as well, in an attempt to seek a new international role.  
Okano-Heijmans studied Japan's foreign policy and found that Japan, a country that engages 
in state-led development as one of the latecomers in an international system, has practiced what can 
be called economic diplomacy.31 Put simply, economic diplomacy is "the pursuit of economic 
security within an anarchic system." Economic security consists of the economic prosperity and 
political stability of a nation. To promote and protect these two types of national interest, a 
government pursues economic diplomacy using a variety of instruments that are relatively more 
economic or political in character. In particular, Japan used official development assistance (ODA) 
as a tool of economic diplomacy and as a tool for restructuring Japanese industry after the 1985 
Plaza Accord.32 For Japan, not only a latecomer but a defeated nation allowed to have only a 
military force for national territorial defence, ODA has been the most important foreign policy tool 
from the post WWII through the post-Cold War era and up to today.33 
Japan began to provide ODA in 1954 after signing the Colombo Plan, which was originally 
an effort to battle communist movements in (South) East Asia after the end of WWII by providing 
physical capital, technology and skills development assistance to countries that needed them.34 
During the economic boom of the 1980s, Japan became one of the world’s largest donors of ODA 
and remains so since. However, Japan’s ODA has long been described as too focused on economy 
with mercantilist motives and on Asia geographically.35 This regional focus is linked to the origin 
of Japan's aid as reparations to its neighbouring countries after WWII.36 ODA given to Asian 
countries was generally combined with trade and investment from the private sector.37 Japan’s 
implied economic interests in its provision of aid prevented it from following international norms 
and the agendas of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
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Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which has been the predominant player in the field of 
foreign aid since it was established in 1961.38 
For Japan, ODA has served a variety of purposes that are not limited to ‘development’ per 
se but also for diplomatic and economic policy purposes towards other developing and developed 
countries. Nonetheless, throughout the last sixty years, there have been major changes in the 
objectives and implementation instruments of Japan’s ODA. For instance, the overall goals of ODA 
changed from economic development and the ‘economic take-off’ of developing countries to 
poverty reduction.39 Foreign aid activities are administered under a much more centralized system.40 
While at the same time, there is a common thread in Japan’s ODA policy and practices: an 
emphasis on economic growth through private sector activities, supported by infrastructure and 
human resource development.41  
Curiously enough, these elements of Japan’s ODA – a strong belief in economic 
development through industrialization and the state’s role in mobilizing private sector resources in 
order to achieve it – closely resemble the path by which Japan achieved its economic success as a 
developmental state. Indeed, Japan's aid policy is autobiographic; it reflects its interpretation of its 
own development history and position in global politics.42 The country’s past as an industrial 
latecomer is used as a principal reason for its particular approach, despite criticism from Western 
donors. Japan considers itself as having a role to lead other developing countries because it can 
understand what it means to make self-help efforts. Thus, I argue that Japan’s foreign policy reflects 
its political economic system under communitarian capitalism, where an interventionist state and 
the private sector collaborate and manage the market economy in order to achieve economic 
development and autonomy of the state. Japan’s foreign policy, particularly tools of economic 
diplomacy such as ODA is most indicative of Japan’s own, normative interpretation of its 
developmental path. Japan’s economic diplomacy therefore is the foreign policy of a developmental 
state, which serves to fulfil Japan’s interest to secure its economic prosperity and political stability 
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as well as to establish Japan’s role in the international system by exporting and promoting the 
‘Japan Model’—the developmental state model.43 
5.  Japan's Foreign Policy towards the Arctic Region 
I have set out the way that Japan considers ODA as an important tool of its diplomacy, and that 
promotion of its domestic technologies and expertise abroad is considered an important mission, 
backed by its narrative of domestic development success as a developmental state. Japan’s foreign 
policy towards the Arctic provides a picture of its latest venture to increase its international profile 
by intervening in regions beyond the developing world, where Japan has long exercised its 
economic diplomacy and endeavoured to export the developmental state model. 
The Arctic is the region above the Arctic Circle, which is an imaginary line circling the 
globe at approximately 66° 34’ N, with the North Pole at its centre.44 Since the first explorers 
reached the North Pole in the beginning of the twentieth century, the Arctic Region has remained a 
peripheral region of the coastal states. During the Cold War, the Arctic became a strategically 
crucial region where the two major protagonists of the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union, 
bordered one another and where strategic weapons systems were installed. As the Cold War ended, 
however, attention to the Arctic Region shifted from the strategic, security-focused role to the 
growing body of evidence pointing to the effects of global warming and climate change. The Arctic, 
once a region locked by thick ice, is becoming ice-free for longer periods and over a greater area for 
each passing year. All of the eight Arctic states (Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, 
Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia and the USA) indicate increased traffic and regional activities due 
to melting ice as a positive economic opportunity but also as a potential security and governance 
challenge. 
Japan, along with other non-Arctic, Asian states, took note of these changes in the Arctic 
and expressed its interest to be more involved through various means. The most recent and 
significant effort was its successful application to gain observer status at the Arctic Council, a 
 14 
leading intergovernmental forum for cooperation in and about the Arctic Region, in 2013. Japan’s 
interest in the Arctic goes back to the pre-WWII period with a particular interest in exploring the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR), a shipping route running along the Russian Arctic coast from the Kara 
Sea, along Siberia, to the Bering Strait, connecting Asia and Europe with a much shorter distance 
than a traditional South-bound route. Following WWII, Japan’s general interest in the Arctic faded 
and did not re-emerge until the beginning of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the 
Murmansk Initiative was introduced in 1987 to establish the Arctic as a ‘zone of peace’. Japan 
joined the effort by setting up domestic institutions for scientific research such as the Centre for 
Arctic Research at the National Institute of Polar Research and a research station in Svalbard, 
Norway. 
After Japan submitted its application to the Arctic Council in 2009, Japan as a non-Arctic 
state sought to convince the Arctic coastal states of its legitimacy with a variety of initiatives. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) established an Arctic Task Force and eventually assigned an 
Arctic ambassador. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) 
introduced nationwide, large-scale research programs. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism (MLIT) began special committee meetings with related ministries, private 
businesses and advisors to investigate the current status and future policy on the NSR.45 The 
Cabinet Office included the Arctic in the government’s Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. In 2015, Japan 
announced its first official Arctic Policy, which lists seven areas that Japan believes must be 
addressed: global environmental issues, indigenous peoples of the Arctic, science and technology, 
ensuring the rule of law and promoting international cooperation, Arctic sea routes, natural resource 
development, and national security. As specific measures, the Policy lists three initiatives: research 
and development, international cooperation and sustainable use of Arctic resources. 
The majority of Japan's diplomatic efforts towards the Arctic are made by the members of 
the epistemic community using their scientific knowledge gained from nationally-funded research 
projects. Japan uses the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability (ArCS) project as the main vehicle as 
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well as a showcase for Japanese policymakers towards the Arctic region. The ArCS is funded by 
MEXT and was announced in 2015 as a 5-year project with 500-650 million Japanese Yen 
(approximately 4-5.3 million USD). Of numerous meetings and conferences on the Arctic, the 
Arctic Council is regarded as the most relevant forum – in particular Ministerial Meetings where 
Japan participates as an observer and Working Groups where Japanese experts can be more actively 
involved. 
In Japan’s approach towards the Arctic Region, undoubtedly the Japanese state plays the 
largest role. The Japanese government recognizes the sovereignty of the Arctic states in the Arctic 
Region therefore any issues related to the Region, including economic, should be taken up in an 
existing institutional framework such as the Arctic Council. MoFA is mainly responsible for 
representing Japan at various international meetings, respecting the rule of law. MLIT bears Japan’s 
interest in the development of the new shipping routes such as the NSR. It is worth pointing out that 
it is MEXT that has the longest history of involvement in the Arctic and has allocated the largest 
budget among other ministries to the Arctic so far, mostly concentrated around scientific research 
and building a polar scientists network. This is due to a strong influence from the segment of the 
ministry that absorbed the Science and Technology Agency in 2001. The Agency’s duty was to 
plan, and promote policies related to Japan’s science and technology as well as to conduct large-
scale projects that Japan “should uniformly promote as a nation, such as nuclear power, outer space 
development and maritime development”.46 The mission of the Agency, which was established in 
1956, was to catch up with the technological competitors during the Cold War but this later shifted 
to supporting basic research.47 The shift was a reaction to criticisms from other developed countries 
that Japan achieved economic development in the 1980s partly by “free-riding on basic science and 
technological research”.48 This narrative of legitimizing the state’s involvement in science and 
technology in order to achieve economic growth is identical to what we have seen in Japan’s 
industrial policies as well as foreign development assistance after WWII. 
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To complement and enhance the Japanese state’s Arctic policy, Japanese business groups 
have played an informal yet substantial role. The Japanese bureaucracy and business groups are 
interdependent, particularly in foreign policy; the bureaucracy relies on business groups to gather 
political information of interest and on their intelligence capacities, while business groups depend 
on the government for support and guidance on trade-related issues. In the case of the Arctic, 
various organizations under the umbrella of the Nippon Foundation, most significantly the OPRI 
under the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, has been instrumental in shaping Japan’s engagement in the 
Arctic Region as well as preparing, planning and implementing the formal Arctic Policy. The 
Nippon Foundation is Japan’s largest philanthropic foundation but based on profits from public 
speedboat racing with an annual revenue of 46 billion JPY (approximately 417 million USD) in 
2016 and provides financial assistance for maritime shipping activities, welfare projects, as well as 
international development.49 The OPRI is a private think-tank and a lobbying organization for the 
Japanese shipping industry and related manufacturing industries. Already in 1993, just a few years 
after the Murmansk Initiative but long before the issue of melting ice captured international 
attention, the Ship & Ocean Foundation (the precursor to OPRI) in cooperation with two research 
institutes from Russia and Norway initiated a six-year research project on the technical feasibility of 
the NSR as an international commercial sea route. Today the Nippon Foundation reliably supports 
the Japanese government, research community and business groups by providing financial 
assistance to their extensive activities. This is a salient example of new strategic sectors for the 
Japanese economy being still managed under a coordinated market system. 
A narrative shared among the bureaucracy, politicians and business groups of Japan is that 
science and technology is essential in the economic development of Japan.50 Indeed, in November 
1995, the Science and Technology Basic Law was enacted and this became the basis of Japan’s 
science and technology policy. The Law states that its objective is “to achieve a higher standard of 
science and technology, to contribute to the development of the economy and society of Japan”.51 
There was a shared understanding that, in order to shake off the long recession and the end of the 
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era of Japan as a “catching-up nation” to the Western developed economies, it was essential to 
create new industries by developing high-tech scientific technologies.52 In other words, in order to 
maintain the status in the world that Japan achieved after WWII with a developmental state 
approach, science and technology was deemed a key. The logic behind this was that, first, science 
and technology enabled Japan to achieve economic growth and address environmental problems 
that arose with it; second, this mere science and technology is now "one of the few internationally 
viable trump cards held by resource- and energy-poor Japan.” .53 
Japan’s Arctic policy, therefore, can be understood as an extension of Japan’s economic 
diplomacy to achieve economic security, as well as an attempt to export the Japanese 
developmental state model to the Arctic Region using science and technology as a vehicle. Indeed, 
Japan regards the Arctic as a "diplomatic challenge that requires scientific and technological 
knowledge to produce effective solutions.”54 I have argued that Japan's foreign policy reflects its 
political economic system, in which an interventionist state and the private sector collaborate and 
manage the market economy to achieve economic development and autonomy of the state. In 
addition, Japan's foreign policy, particularly as it pertains to the economy such as ODA, exhibits its 
normative interpretation of the nation’s developmental path. Similarly, Japan attempts to engage in 
the Arctic Region using its scientific and technological knowledge. This is not simply because 
science and technology are one of the few diplomatic tools available under the existing framework 
with the Arctic Council at the core, but because it will eventually bring about economic 
development for the Arctic region and for Japan (and it may even prevent or solve potential 
environmental problems), in the way that Japan achieved economic development after the WWII. 
Indeed, because Japan is by nature an outsider in the Arctic Region as a non-coastal state 
and in fact has "little say in decision making at high-level meetings”, Japan’s Arctic policy is 
compelled to be less practical and more normative and value-oriented.55 For Japan the 
developmental state approach has worked effectively, or at least there is a broad consensus that the 
path taken by Japan during the seven decades after the end of WWII has been a success. In 
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constructing its narrative to legitimize its participation in Arctic politics, Japan took up on one of 
the most significant elements of Japan as a modern developmental state: science and technology. In 
terms of institutions of political economic system, Japan may no longer strictly qualify as a strong 
developmental state as Johnson described, but belief in developmentalism and communitarian 
capitalism remain strong. Japan’s foreign policy towards the Arctic encompasses norms and values 
derived from these beliefs. 
7.  Implications and Lessons learned for the Global South 
In light of questions this special issue attempts to address, such as the role of the state in 
economic development as well as its evolution and the possibility of referring to the concept of 
‘developmental states’ in understanding the reorganization of power and capital in the world 
economy, there are a few implications this paper can provide. The most important precept is that 
one must be aware of an unconscious bias of looking at a nation’s political economic system from 
the view point of success or failure. The lesson Japan’s experience provides is that it is crucial that a 
developmental state remains innovative and assesses the appropriate timing to switch from a strong 
developmental state to a weaker developmental state. In the case of Japan, it failed to determine that 
it had already passed the state of ‘catching-up’ by the 1980s and to make necessary adjustments. In 
addition, without institutions to enhance the cooperative behaviour of the bureaucracy, businesses 
and politicians as well as norms that exist in the wider society about what is important, it is 
extremely difficult for an interventionist state to implement policies to achieve economic 
development and the autonomy of the state.  
The process of making foreign policy contextualised and reinforced these norms both for 
Japan’s domestic and international audiences. Norm-oriented foreign policy creates a broad 
framework that communicates a narrative about the vision of a particular circumstance; in the case 
of development assistance, a normative framework of aid provides the vision of development as 
progress and how best to achieve it.56 We saw earlier one of Japan’s norms of development 
assistance (as well as a programmatic focus) was investing in human and economic infrastructure 
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based on a development model that draws on Japan's own experience with industrialization and 
reconstruction. Similarly, Japan applies its own understanding of development based on its past 
towards the Arctic region. The most suitable way to achieve sustainable development—a state 
where there is sufficient amount of economic growth but potential environmental problems caused 
by climatic changes are kept at minimum—in the Arctic is through the full utilization of science and 
technology. 
For Japan, the institutional structure or industrial policies associated with a developmental 
state were not necessarily a matter of choice; rather, it was a survival strategy as a war-torn, late-
comer country in the international economic system. As it entered the system rather forcefully, 
however, Japanese policies were contested. Japan’s foreign assistance has been contested at home 
and abroad. Through these contests, Japan became a more rounded aid donor, blending Western 
principles with concepts of 'self-help', advocating large infrastructure projects that serve both 
Japan's and recipient countries’ interests.57 These debates around Japan’s attempt to export the 
Japan Model abroad have been particularly important in making Japan’s political economic system 
as a modern developmental state appealing to international audiences—what  might be 
characterised as the exercising of Japan’s soft power. Japan’s example of utilising external policies 
in order to adjust to the changing global system over time, and creating an institutional feedback 
mechanism by exporting institutions and exposing them to criticism and contest from the outside 
world, is a particularly useful lesson for a later-comer state in the Global South.  
Japan’s experience as a developmental state—and empirical cases from other papers from 
this special issue—inform us that in a globalized economy today, state intervention in a country’s 
economic direction is a necessity, even if one is an adherent of neoliberalism. Japan’s political 
economic system may no longer fit the classic model of a developmental state, where there is a 
strong state leadership guiding the country’s rapid industrialization. However, state-business 
relations are still strong and a professional bureaucracy remains the basis of institutionalized 
expertise in modern Japan. Therefore, an assessment of a developmental state should be extended to 
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a long-term performance of institutions. Indeed, as Richard Stubbs pointed out, the idea of the 
developmental state itself has been resilient or has had a certain “stickiness” to it.58 In the case of 
Japan, this ‘stickiness’ is guaranteed and enhanced by strong, shared societal norms to raise the 
national level of prosperity. 
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